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EDITOR'S NOTE: The editors have not altered this brief amicus cu-
riae, except to comply with law review format. This brief was submit-
ted by a group of copyright professors* to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit. At the time of publication of this sym-
posium issue, the Court of Appeals was rehearing Lotus Development
Corporation v. Borland International, Inc. as a result of the recusal of
Judge Stephen G. Breyer, who was appointed to the United States
Supreme Court. University of Pittsburgh School of Law Professor
Pamela Samuelson made a presentation based on this brief at the
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Sixth Annual Computer Law Symposium held February 12, 1994 at
the University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
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Borland International, Inc. - Brief
Amicus Curiae of Copyright
Law Professors
I
Purposes of the Brief
This brief amicus curiae sets forth the nature of copyright analysis
that we, as professors who teach and write about copyright law, be-
lieve to be appropriate for determining the scope of copyright protec-
tion for computer programs.
The first substantive section of this brief will discuss the reasons
for and the implications of the Congressional mandate that ideas, pro-
cedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, princi-
ples and discoveries are beyond the scope of copyright protection
available to computer programs under 17 U.S.C. §102(b). This man-
date should be taken quite as seriously as the provision expressing
Congress's decision to treat computer programs as copyrightable sub-
ject matter. The District Court in its decisions in this case has failed to
take sufficient account of the traditional principles of copyright law
embodied in §102(b). The second substantive section will explain why
the successive filtering test for determining copyright infringement in
computer software cases that has been adopted by numerous Courts
of Appeals is more consistent with copyright law and principles than
the District Court's test of "copyrightability".
II
There are Two Congressional Mandates Courts Must
Apply in Computer Program Copyright
Cases.
The District Court in its Paperback and Borland decisions has
given too much attention to one Congressional mandate pertinent to
this case-that computer programs are to be protected by copyright
law-and too little attention to another equally explicit mandate-
that processes, procedures, systems, and methods of operation em-
bodied in copyrighted works are beyond the scope of copyright pro-
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tection in these works.' This section will explain the origins of and
reasons for the copyright rule that excludes processes, procedures, sys-
tems, and methods of operation from the scope of copyright protec-
tion available to functional writings and the implications of these
exclusions for cases involving computer programs.
A. The Text Of Section 102(b) And Its Legislative History
To understand the meaning of the copyright provision excluding
such things as processes and systems from the scope of copyright pro-
tection, it is well to begin with an examination of the text of that sec-
tion. Section 102(b) of Title 17 of the U.S. Code reads, in pertinent
part: "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any.. .procedure, process, system, [or] method of
operation. . ., regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."
The legislative history of this provision indicates that Congress
had computer programs in mind when adopting this provision and
meant for it to limit the scope of copyright protection available for
computer programs. Concerns had been expressed at legislative hear-
ings on revision of the copyright law about the need for such a provi-
sion so that copyright protection would not be construed too broadly
for programs.2 Both the House and Senate Committee reports plainly
state: "Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer
programs should extend to the methodology or processes adopted by
the programmer, rather than merely to the 'writing' expressing his
ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other things, to make clear
that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copyrightable
element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or
methods embodied in the program are not within the scope of copy-
right law." 3
The legislative history of section 102(b) also indicates that the
provision was intended to reflect and be consistent with a long line of
copyright cases, including Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), that
had held that constituent elements of systems, processes, and the like
were beyond the scope of copyright protection available to an original.
1. The first of these mandates is evidenced in 17 U.S.C. §101 (definition of "computer
program"); the second is evidenced in 17 U.S.C. §102(b).
2. Hearings on S. 597 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, & Copy-
rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1967).
3. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 and S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976).
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work of authorship.4 The National Commission on New Technologi-
cal Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) made reference to section
102(b) and to functional writing cases such as Baker v. Selden and
Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958) as
among the sources of guidance that courts would utilize in judging
copyright infringement claims involving computer programs.5 Con-
gress relied on the CONTU Report in enacting the amendments to
copyright law that defined computer program and provided for some
special rules for programs, 6 thereby giving the report a measure of
Congressional imprimatur.
B. Baker v. Selden And Policy Reasons For The Exclusion Of Systems
And Processes From The Scope Of Copyright Protection
Baker v. Selden is the seminal case out of which developed a long
line of copyright cases in which courts have held that constituent ele-
ments of systems or processes are outside the scope of copyright pro-
tection. This aspect of Baker v. Selden is now codified in 17 U.S.C.
§102(b).
Selden claimed copyright infringement because Baker included in
his accounting book a set of sample ledger sheets that were substan-
tially similar in selection and arrangement of columns and headings to
those Selden had included in the book he wrote on the same book-
keeping system. The principal issue before the Court was whether
someone besides Selden could "make or use similar ruled lines and
headings, or ruled lines and headings made and arranged on substan-
tially the same system, without violating the copyright." 101 U.S. at
101.
The Supreme Court concluded that Selden's copyright protected
his explanation of the system, but not the system itself. Because the
selection and arrangement of columns and headings were constituent
parts of the system, they too were beyond the scope of copyright pro-
4. Id. (indicating an intent to restate the caselaw). Among the cases regarding sec-
tion 102(b) as codifying the principal holding of Baker v. Selden are NEC v. Intel Corp., 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1177, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 1989) and Signo Trading Int'l v. Gordon, 535 F.
Supp. 362, 365. (N.D. Cal. 1981).
5. See Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of
Copyrighted Works 18-23 (1979) (cited hereinafter as "CONTU Report").
6. 17 U.S.C. §§101 (definition of "computer program"), 117 (providing privileges to
copy programs to use them, to make backup copies, and to make some adaptations to
programs).
7. Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992)(giv-
ing deference to CONTU Report). See also Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) and Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714
F.2d 1240, 1251 (3d Cir. 1983).
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tection. Selden's copyright gave him no more of an exclusive right to
the bookkeeping system than the copyright on a book about the com-
position or use of medicines would give its author an exclusive rights
to the medicinal compounds or uses of them discussed in the book.
The Supreme Court explained: "[T]o [give] the author of the book an
exclusive property in the [useful] art described therein, when no ex-
amination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a sur-
prise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-
patent, not of copyright." Id. at 102.8
Having apparently failed to secure a patent on his bookkeeping
system,9 Selden was, in the Court's view, trying to get indirectly-
through a copyright infringement action-a kind of protection which
he had failed to get directly from the Patent Office, namely, an exclu-
sive right in the system. Id. at 104-05. Selden was trying to get this
exclusive right without satisfying the rigors of the patent system. To
allow Selden to accomplish his goal through copyright protection
would subvert and undermine the patent system, for it is a fundamen-
tal principle of the patent system that advances in the useful arts that
do not meet patent law's novelty and nonobviousness standards or
otherwise fail to satisfy patent law requirements are, if revealed in a
publicly circulated product, freely available to be copied by
competitors.1"
8. In Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1991) (Bor-
land I), the District Court stated that "[t]he mere fact that patent law allows a means of
legal protection for a process... does not establish that there is not also some protection in
copyright law." Id. at 91. It cited the Supreme Court decision in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201 (1954) as a precedent recognizing an overlap of copyright and patent protection. Ma-
zer, however, involved a subject matter that was potentially eligible for both copyright and
design patent protection. The statuette in that case was eligible for copyright protectibn as
a sculpture. Because it was intended for sale as a lamp base, it was also potentially eligible
for protection as a new and original ornamental design for an article of manufacture under
design patent law, 35 U.S.C. §171. We do not read Mazer as recognizing an overlap of
copyright and utility patent subject matter, and we know of no precedent which recognizes
the coexistence of copyright and utility patent in the same aspect of the same work. We do
know of some cases applying the principles of Baker v. Selden in which owners of expired
utility patents have been unsuccessful in claiming copyright in the same work. See, e.g.,
Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir.1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 785 (1944) (involving a chart for use in a temperature recording machine; expressing
the view that utility patents and copyright do not overlap in subject matter). See also Sega,
977 F.2d at 1526 and Atari Games, 975 F.2d at 842 (expressing concern that copyright law
not be construed to give patent-like protection to functional elements of programs).
9. The Lawyers Edition synopsis of the arguments of Baker's lawyer suggests that
Selden had tried to patent this system. See 25 L.Ed. 841-842. The Supreme Court opinion
indicates that Selden didn't get a patent on it. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. at 104.
10. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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The principles of Baker v. Selden have been applied in a long line
of cases sanctioning the right of competitors to reproduce functional
content regardless of the tangible medium in which it was first fixed.'
Competitors have, for example, been allowed to copy such things as
the design of a three-dimensional boiler or article of clothing, even
though to do so may require the making of a schematic representation
of it which will look very much like the plaintiff's design document.
1 2
This line of cases, now codified in 17 U.S.C. §113(b), reflects the gen-
eral principle laid down in Baker v. Selden that the exclusive repro-
duction rights of copyright cannot prevent-directly or indirectly-
the use of unprotected ideas or utilitarian features of functional
works.
In Baker v. Selden, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that this
principle applies to functional works regardless of whether they are
expressed in a literary or graphic form:
The fact that the art described in the book by illustrations of lines
and figures which are reproduced in practice in the application of the
art, makes no difference .... Had he used words of description in-
stead of diagrams. . .there could not be the slightest doubt that
others, applying the art to practical use, might lawfully draw the
lines and diagrams.. •which he [the author] thus described by words
in his book.
The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot
give.. .an exclusive right to the methods of operation.. .or to the
diagrams which he employs to explain them, so as toprevent an en-
gineer from using them whenever occasion requires.
Later commentators, including Professor Benjamin Kaplan of
Harvard, understood this statement to establish a kind of fair use ap-
plicable to scientific and functional works.
14
11. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Computer Programs, User Interfaces, and Section
102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976: A Critique of Lotus v. Paperback, 55 Law & Con-
temp. Probs. 311, 324 n.61 (1992), republished in 6 High Techn. L.J. 209, 226, n. 73 (1992)
(cited hereinafter as "Critique of Paperback") for a partial listing of Baker v. Selden's
progeny.
12. See, e.g., Combustion Eng'g, Inc. v. Murray Tube Works, Inc., 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
239, 244 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); Muller v. Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y.
1942); National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Standard Mail Order Co., 191 F. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
13. 101 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added).
14. See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 63-66 (1967) (stating
that "the [Baker] privilege extends to exact copies"); H. Ball, The Law of Copyright and
Literary Property 125-28, 274-78 (1944); A. Weil, American Copyright Law 191, 209, 411-
12 (1917) (emphasizing the role of Baker v. Selden as a limitation on the reproduction right
and not as a test of copyrightability). One eminent commentator has deviated from this
historical tradition in recent years. See Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, 3 Nimmer
On Copyright §2.18[A], [B] (1993) (cited hereinafter as "Nimmer on Copyright"), criti-
cized in J. H. Reichman, Computer Programs As Applied Scientific Know-How: Implica-
tions of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University Research, 42 Vand. L. Rev.
639, 693 n. 288 (1989) (cited hereinafter as "Programs as Know-How"), Samuelson, Cri-
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The very fact that such functional ideas are so valuable explains
why copyright law, with its low standards for obtaining protection and
its long duration of exclusive rights, will not protect them. As Profes-
sor Goldstein has observed:
Functional works [such as architectural plans, legal forms, and com-
puter programs] depend for their value primarily on the ingenuity,
accuracy, and efficiency-the utility-of their underlying system,
concept or method. As a result, enforcement of copyright in these
works inevitably threatens the fundamental precept that copyright
protection shall not extend to any "idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery." Copyright
in functional works is in this respect like copyright in fact works,
which pose the similar danger of monopolizing elements that should
be available for free use by all. The important difference is that in
protecting works that are essentially functional in nature, copyright
may contradict the principle that protection for these utilitarian ele-
ments is better left to the more exacting standards of patent and
trade secret law.
15
In short, Baker v. Selden has consigned functional works to a re-
gime of "thin" protection in order to defend the line of demarcation
between patent and copyright law. 6
A weakening of Baker v. Selden's limitations on the scope of pro-
tection available to functional writings would run counter to two re-
cent Supreme Court opinions. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co. the Court ruled that a competitor could copy
valuable but unprotectable facts from the plaintiff's directory, relying
in part on the principles of Baker v. Selden.17 The Court observed in
Feist that the right to copy unprotected material from copyrighted
works is not an unforeseen byproduct of the statutory scheme of copy-
right, but rather of its essence.' 8 In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., 9 the Court ruled that a state "plug-mold" statute
conflicted with the Congressional purposes underlying the federal pat-
ent system because the state law would have removed from the public
tique of Paperback, supra note 11, 6 High Tech. L. J. at 228-29, n81-82, and Ralph S.
Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 Minn.
L. Rev. 579, 600-06 (1985).
15. Paul Goldstein, Copyright Principles, Law & Practice §8.5 at 116-17 (1989).
16. 101 U.S. at 102; see also Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. 124, 130
(E.D. Mich. 1979) (thin protection of functional works is an "open secret"); Sega, 977 F.2d
at 1524 (discussing reasons why functional writings have a thinner scope of protection than
other classes of works); Altai, 982 F.2d at 704 ("compared to aesthetic works, computer
programs hover even more closely to the elusive boundary line described in § 102(b)").
17. 111 S.Ct. 1282, 1290, 1297 (1991).
18. Id. at 1289-90.
19. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
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domain functional designs that had not undergone the patent exami-
nation process.
C. The District Court's Misapplication Of Baker v. Selden And Principles
Embodied In Section 102(b)
In Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37
(D. Mass. 1990), the District Court described Baker v. Selden as hav-
ing held that "the text of a book describing a special method of
double-entry accounting on paper spreadsheets...was copyrightable
expression, but that the,.. idea of this particular kind of double-entry
bookkeeping, was not." Id. at 54 (emphasis in the original). The
Supreme Court's statement of its holding in that case was importantly
different than this. The Court stated that Selden's copyright protected
his "explanation" of the useful art it described but not the "useful art"
itself, which, as we have said, was the bookkeeping system and its con-
stituent parts that were embodied in the sample ledger sheets in Sel-
den's book. 101 U.S. at 105.
This correct formulation of the rule of Baker v. Selden makes
clear something that courts today sometimes forget about Baker v.
Selden: that it is fundamentally a case about the unprotectability of
the functional content of written works and the right of others to copy
that content in order to make use of it.20 To speak of Baker v. Selden
as a case that concerns the unprotectability of abstract ideas, as the
District Court has done, is to miss the main point of the case.
Although the District Court has repeatedly rejected Borland's in-
terpretation of Baker v. Selden and its arguments about the implica-
tions of that case for a proper understanding of the exclusions of
section 102(b), the District Court in its Borland decisions has not
stated its own understanding of the ruling of the case. Instead, the
District Court has tried to distinguish Baker v. Selden by saying that
the case had been decided before computer programs were invented
and before Learned Hand formulated the "patterns of abstractions"
approach in the Nichols case.21 Borland 1, 788 F. Supp. at 92-93. Con-
cerning section 102(b), the District Court's principal point has been
that the terms "process" or "system" cannot be taken too literally or
else computer programs would be unprotectable by copyright law. Id.
at 91. The District Court seems to believe that section 102(b)'s exclu-
sions of "processes" and "systems" are merely restatements of the un-
protectability of abstract ideas. Id..
20. See, e.g., Reichman, Programs As Know-How, supra note 14, at 693, n.288; Samu-
elson, Critique of Paperback, 6 High Tech. L. J. at 228.
21. Nichols v Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930)
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Even after the Second Circuit in Computer Associates Int'l, Inc.
v. Altai, Inc. emphasized the essentially utilitarian nature of computer
programs and cited the pertinence of cases like Baker v. Selden for
determining the proper scope of copyright protection for computer
programs,22 the District Court still refrained from stating its interpre-
tation of Baker v. Selden, Baker's progeny, or other cases applying
section 102(b). Disappointingly few such cases are even mentioned in
the District Court's Borland opinions. 23 The District Court's most re-
cent response to Borland's argument that the command hierarchy of
Lotus 1-2-3 is beyond the scope of copyright protection as an insepa-
rable part of Lotus's macro system was the Court's statement in Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1993)
(Borland IV) that "Gone With The Wind" could also be characterized
as a "system," by which the court signaled its unwillingness to con-
sider the matter further. See Borland IV, 831 F. Supp. at 230-231.
This simply does not comport with the Congressional mandate to ex-
clude processes, systems, and the like from the scope of copyright pro-
22. Altai, 982 F.2d. at 704-05.
23. In its Paperback and Borland decisions, the District Court does discuss one line of
Baker v. Selden's progeny, namely the "useful article" cases. We agree with the District
Court that principles from cases involving useful articles and drawings of useful articles can
usefully be brought to bear in computer program cases, although we think the court is
mistaken about what those cases hold. Contrary to the District Court's impression in Bor-
land I and elsewhere, see, e.g., 788 F. Supp. at 97, Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific
Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987), does not hold that a shape must be solely dic-
tated by function to be unprotectable by copyright law. In Brandir, seemingly minor
changes had been made to the configuration of a sculptural form. Brandir charged Cas-
cade with copyright infringement because it copied this derivative design. The court in
Brandir observed that the changes in design had been made in order to make the "sculp-
ture" more suited to use as a bicycle rack. The intermixture of form and function in the
modified design caused the work to be considered a "useful article" which was unprotect-
able by copyright law. See 17 U.S. C. §101 (definition of "useful article"). The court's
ruling of uncopyrightability of the derivative design was not based on the design being
solely dictated by function.
When computer programs generate pictures or text as elements of user interfaces,
copyright law will have no more difficulty in protecting such expressive elements of the
interface than it would have in protecting a tiny sculpture of a parrot that might be used as
part of the user interface of a lamp machine (i.e., a device with which to turn on the lamp's
light bulb). The parrot can be copyrighted because of its capacity to exist as a work of art
separate from its role as an element of the user interface of a lamp. Other parts of the user
interface of the same lamp in which the functionality of the user interface and the design
were intermixed would not, however, be protectable by copyright law under the useful
article doctrine. From the standpoint of copyright law, it would be immaterial how many
alternative functional designs might available to the competitor. The proper test for judg-
ing whether a design of this sort is copyrightable is not whether the form is dictated solely
by its function, but rather whether its expressive aspects are separable from its functional
aspects. If a form has any function beyond conveying information or displaying an appear-
ance, it is uncopyrightable. See 17 U.S.C. §101 (definition of "useful article").
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tection available to computer programs, nor with the Baker v. Selden
tradition of according "thin" protection to functional writings.
To illustrate differences between the District Court's analysis in
the Borland opinions and the Supreme Court's analysis in Baker v.
Selden, we think it instructive to apply the District Court's "copyright-
ability" test to the facts of Baker v. Selden.
The first step of the District Court's method of analysis seems to
involve construction of a hierarchy of abstractions for the aspect of
the work whose "copyrightability" is to be determined.24 If one con-
structed a hierarchy of abstractions for the ledger sheet portion of Sel-
den's accounting book, the selection of certain words as headings and
the arrangement of them and the columns under which entries would
be made would seem to be at the lowest level of abstraction. Under
the District Court's methodology, this would suggest that these as-
pects of the ledger sheets were expressive.
Consistent with the second step of the District Court's methodol-
ogy, one would not inquire whether this selection and arrangement
was a constituent element of a system, but rather whether the idea of
an accounting system and Selden's expression of it were merged. To
discern whether this was so, a court would likely examine other ac-
counting books available in the marketplace, just as the District Court
considered the market availability of other spreadsheet programs in
Paperback and Borland." A study of these other accounting books
would likely reveal that Selden's particular selection and arrangement
of elements were not essential to every expression of the idea of an
accounting system26 or solely dictated by the accounting functions
they were to perform.27 Insofar as Selden had freedom of choice
about which words to use and in what order to arrange them, under
the District Court's methodology, they would likely be treated as ex-
24. The Distript Court's methodology is discussed in greater detail in Section III.
25. See, e.g., Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 65-69.
26. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 217 (D. Mass.
1992) (Borland II) (using the "not essential to every expression of that idea" test).
27. We see nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion in Baker v. Selden to suggest that
the Court's ruling depended on whether Selden invented his system before selecting and
arranging the columns and headings in the ledger sheets or developed the system and the
ledger sheets simultaneously or even developed the ledger sheets first and then decided
later that they would permit people to do better accounting in accordance with a system
they suggested. The District Court in this case seems to suggest that merger can only be
found if the system existed first and dictated the arrangement of elements. See Borland II,
799 F. Supp. at 212-13 ("I assume in Borland's favor that.. .the macro language.. .evolved
simultaneously with the menu commands that delimit it. Nevertheless, it is beyond dispute
that the macro language did not evolve first," id. at 213 (emphasis in the original)). The
caselaw, including the "useful article" caselaw discussed supra note 23, does not support
this distinction.
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pressive rather than being merged with the idea of an accounting
system.
In line with the third step of the District Court's methodology,
one would next inquire whether the ledger sheets were a substantial
or nontrivial component of Selden's book. The answer to this ques-
tion would almost certainly be yes. Since Baker's ledger sheets were
substantially similar to Selden's, infringement would probably have
been found under the District Court's methodology as applied to
Baker v. Selden. As we have shown, this is not what the Supreme
Court ruled in Baker v. Selden.
We are troubled not only by the District Court's misapplication of
Baker v. Selden and its progeny, but also by the court's characteriza-
tion of the Lotus command hierarchy as "a fundamental part of the
functionality of keystroke sequences and the macro language." Bor-
land 11, 799 F. Supp. at 207.28 This evokes in us the same kind of
concern that the previous copyright law professor amicus brief ex-
pressed about statements in Paperback to the effect that the command
hierarchy of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface was a fundamental part of
the functionality of the Lotus macro facility.29 It would appear to us
that a macro language and fundamental parts of its functionality
would be beyond the scope of copyright protection under principles
deriving from Baker v. Selden and the "shorthand system" cases de-
cided some years ago. 3° Not only the abstract rules for the shorthand
system, but also the vocabulary of the system are beyond the scope of
protection available to the owner of the copyright in the first book
explaining the system. The District Court has not addressed these
cases or other cases giving a narrow scope of copyright protection to
functional writings.
We are also troubled that the District Court seems to be more
bothered by functional uses of the Lotus commands or the hierarchy
28. See also Borland II at 213 ("It is no doubt true that the macros have functional
significance. Moreover, as this court found in Paperback, the menu 'system' is a fundamen-
tal part of the functionality of the macro language and the macros.") and 219 ("The menu
command hierarchy is an integral part of the functionality of the macros and of the keys-
troke sequences.").
29. Brief Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors, Lotus Devl. Corp. v. Borland
Int'l, Inc., Civ. No. 90-11662-K (Sept. 1991), at 8, citing Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 65.
30. See, e.g., Brief English Systems, Inc. v. Owen, 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
283 U.S. 858 (1931) and Griggs v. Perrin, 49 F. 15 (N.D.N.Y. 1892). A number of academic
commentators have questioned the availability of copyright protection for languages. See
sources cited in Samuelson, A Critique of Paperback, supra note 11, 6 High Tech. L. J. at
238, n122.
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than by informative displays of them." From the standpoint of tradi-
tional principles of copyright law, this strikes us as backwards.
In Paperback the District Court seemed to say that it would have
been lawful for a competing spreadsheet product to display the Lotus
commands on a help screen to inform users what the equivalent com-
mand would be in the competing product, or to have a macro conver-
sion facility such as that provided in Microsoft's Excel product.32 Yet
in Borland IV, the District Court found infringement based on Bor-
land's use of a "key reader" feature that permits users to execute the
same commands to perform the same functions as the Lotus program.
Execution of program functions through use of this feature does not
involve any display of the Lotus commands or any part of the Lotus
command hierarchy.33 In Borland IV, the court seems to have found
infringement based on similarities in the selection and arrangement of
executable functions.34
Finding infringement based on similarities in executable functions
comes perilously close to finding infringement based on the fact that
the two programs perform the same functions. This is not consistent
with our understanding of what Congress intended by section
102(b).35 Nor does it comport with what Congress expected when en-
acting the computer program-related amendments to the copyright
statute in 1980. Congress had been reassured by CONTU that as long
31. See, e.g., Borland 11, 799 F. Supp. at 219 (emphasis added). ("The menu command
hierarchy is an integral part of the functionality of the macros and of the keystroke se-
quences. Nevertheless, the fact that the macros and keystroke sequences incorporate the
menu command hierarchy into their functionality does not remove the menu command
hierarchy from the scope of copyright, if otherwise subject to copyright protection. More-
over, the macros and keystroke sequences are protected to the extent that it is necessary to
infringe a copyright to use them.")
32. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 69.
33. The District Court speaks of the key reader feature as presenting a "phantom
menu" to users. Borland IV, 831 F. Supp. at 229. Finding infringement based on a "phan-
tom menu" is like saying that it would infringe the copyright in a drawing of a typewriter
keyboard for someone to make a typewriter that would cause an "a" to be produced when
a particular key of the typewriter's' user interface was struck and a "b" to be produced
when another key was struck even if the typewriter did not visually indicate that this key
was the "a" key and that was the "b" key. This example illustrates how far away from
traditional copyright analysis the District Court's approach has taken it.
34. Id. at 231 ("[T]he structure of the menu tree including its designated keys for in-
voking commands (i.e., what Borland copied into the phantom menus) may also be viewed,
in a light favorable to Borland, as a type of selection and arrangement of executable opera-
tions in Lotus 1-2-3.").
35. The District Court in Altai characterized the functional behavior produced when
computer program instructions are executed in the computer's hardware as an unprotect-
able process under 17 USC §102(b). Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F.
Supp. 544, 560 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). This portion of the Altai trial court decision is cited ap-
provingly in the Second Circuit's opinion, Altai, 982 F.2d at 706.
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as programmers wrote their own code, it should not infringe copyright
for two programs to perform the same functions.36
There is, of course, no question that copyright law provides pro-
tection to the literal code of computer programs, that is, to the set of
statements and instructions that can be used in a computer to bring
about certain result under the definition of computer program in the
copyright statute. 17 U.S.C. §101. The courts have enforced this Con-
gressional mandate, and the protection copyright has provided to
computer program code has been very meaningful for software devel-
opers. Copyright has also provided protection to some detailed ele-
ments of the internal structure of programs.37
But there is nothing in the copyright definition of computer pro-
gram or in the legislative history of the 1976 Act or of the 1980 com-
puter program-related amendments to indicate a Congressional intent
to extend copyright protection to the results obtained when program
instructions are executed. The results achieved when program instruc-
tions are executed are often highly functional in nature, such as con-
trolling the operations of a nuclear power plant or performing
spreadsheet functions.38 They will often be the kind of functional pro-
cess that Congress intended to exclude from the scope of copyright
protection by enactment of section 102(b). Courts should closely scru-
tinize claims of infringement based on similarities in the results
achieved when program instructions are executed.39 When the results
achieved by execution of program instructions are textual (an elec-
tronic book, for example) or pictorial (such as videogame graphics) in
nature, courts can be expected to have no serious difficulty applying
traditional copyright principles when charges of infringement arise.40
36. CONTU Report, supra note 5, at 21-22.
37. See, e.g., Altai, 982 F.2d 702-03.
38. We are concerned that what the District Court calls "the feel" of the Lotus pro-
gram and regards as an expressive aspect of the work in Borland IV may really be the
functional behavior of the Lotus program which should be beyond the scope of copyright
protection available to the work.
39. Courts should also be circumspect about extending copyright protection to "user
interfaces" of computer programs, that is, to elements of program interfaces beyond
"screen displays" of text or graphics. Non-display elements of user interfaces of computer
programs may be highly functional in nature. The "user interface" for a flight simulation
program, for example, might very well include airplane cockpit accouterments (such as
knobs, dials, and switches) that under traditional principles of copyright law, are beyond
the scope of copyright protection under the "useful article doctrine." See supra note 23.
40. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d
607 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding infringement because of similarities in pictorial details of two
videogames). The issue of whether the output of a program should be regarded as a cate-
gorically distinct work from the underlying program that generates it is one on which
courts have disagreed. See generally Samuelson, Critique of Paperback, 6 High Tech. L. J.
264-69. See also Altai, 982 F.2d at 703.
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But we see no Congressional mandate for extending copyright protec-
tion to other kinds of program results. Rather, we think other kinds
of results are likely to be processes of the sort that Congress meant to
exclude from the scope of copyright protection by its enactment of
section 102(b).
The highly functional nature of programs and the results they
generate that computer programs makes programs an unusual subject
matter for copyright protection. As Professor Randall Davis of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology has put it, "software is a
machine whose medium of construction happens to be text."' 4 Courts
have come to recognize that computer programs have a hybrid nature
that must be taken into account in determining the scope of protection
available to the program from copyright law.42 This is why we regard
section 102(b) which excludes procedures, processes, systems and
methods of operation from the scope of protection available to pro-
grams to be an equally important Congressional mandate to that
which extended copyright protection to computer programs.
The District Court in this case did not pay sufficient attention to
the Congressional mandate embodied in section 102(b), seemingly be-
cause it so much admired the "extraordinarily sophisticated" macro
language feature of Lotus 1-2-343 which the court regarded as having
required substantial creativity to develop and as constituting a sub-
stantial improvement over the functional features available in previ-
ous spreadsheet programs.44 As we have shown, the functional
content embodied in copyrighted works is often the most creative or
valuable aspect of the work, yet this does not make that functional
content protectable by copyright law.
41. Randall Davis, Intellectual Property and Software: The Assumptions Are Broken,
Proceedings of WIPO Worldwide Symposium on the Intellectual Property Aspects of Arti-
ficial Intelligence at 101, 110 (1991).
42. See, e.g., Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524 ("computer programs are, in essence, utilitarian
articles"). The Second Circuit's decision in Altai to rule that elements of programs neces-
sary to achieve interoperability were unprotectable by copyright law recognizes that the
machine-like nature of programs which often need to interconnect, very much like other
machines do, to perform their functions.
43. Borland 11, 799 F. Supp. at 207.
44. Id. at 219. See also Paperback, 740 F. Supp. 56-58. Inventive improvements in the
technological arts may, of course, be patented. See 35 U.S.C. §101.
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III
The Proper Test for Infringement in Computer
Software Copyright Cases
A. The Genesis of the Paperback/Borland Test
Courts in computer software copyright cases have found it diffi-
cult to articulate a test with which to judge infringement that is both
be true to traditional principles of copyright law and extends the
proper degree of protection to computer program expression. In the
Paperback case, as in Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,45 the
defendants proposed a test that would have limited copyright protec-
tion for computer programs to the "literal" elements of programs, that
is, to the source and object code of the program. In Whelan, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this proposed test for copyright in-
fringement for computer programs and adopted in its stead a test for
infringement that regarded "the idea" of a program as its general pur-
pose or function and all else about the program as "expression" unless
there was only one or a very small number of ways to perform that
function in which case "idea/expression merger" would be found.46
Although Paperback made essentially the same claim as the de-
fendant in Whelan, Paperback framed the issue in a somewhat differ-
ent way. Jaslow claimed not to have infringed the copyright in
Whelan's program because the scope of copyright protection for pro-
grams was, in its view, limited to program code. Paperback, however,
claimed that the user interface of a computer program was "un-
copyrightable" because the user interface of the program was a "non-
literal" element of the work and copyright protection was only
available for the "literal" code of the program. This difference in the
way the issue was framed in Paperback may explain why the District
Court in Paperback developed a "test of copyrightability" which drew
upon the Whelan test in a number of respects, although restating as-
pects of this test in a "copyrightability" framework.47
The first step of the District Court's "copyrightability" test in Pa-
perback defined as "idea" that the Lotus program was an electronic
spreadsheet.48 Some more specific elements of the work, such as the
inverted "L" of the Lotus spreadsheet grid, were viewed as "idea," but
not because they were too abstract to be protected by copyright law,
45. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
46. Id. at 1236.
47. Similarities between the Whelan and Paperback tests are discussed at length in
Samuelson, Critique of Paperback, supra note 11, 6 High Techn. L. J. at 221-225.
48. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 65.
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but because there was such a limited number of ways to design a
spreadsheet grid that, in the second step of the Paperback test, idea/
expression merger was found. 9 Other detailed elements of the Lotus
interface, such as the menu command hierarchy, were not found to be
so limited in expressive possibilities that idea/expression merger
should be found." The Paperback test went beyond the Whelan test
in having a third step which inquired whether the non-merged expres-
sion was a substantial component of the work.5 Through use of this
test, the District Court ruled that many detailed elements of the Lotus
user interface were "copyrightable" and found infringement based on
Paperback's copying of them.
In a previous brief amicus curiae of copyright law professors, a
number of us expressed the view that the test the District Court used
in judging the "copyrightability" of the Lotus 1-2-3 user interface in
Paperback was overbroad and "inconsistent with the copyright statute,
the copyright caselaw, and traditional principles of copyright law."
52
That brief urged that the Paperback test not be used in the Lotus v.
Borland case because it did not permit adequate consideration of
traditional principles of copyright law embodied in section 102(b) and
the caselaw properly interpreting that section.53
At the time the District Court was considering what test to use in
the Lotus v. Borland case, the only appellate court to have expressly
declined to follow Whelan or use its test for infringement was the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 4 Although the Whelan test had by then
been the subject of extensive cogent criticism,55 a few district court
49. Id. at 66-67.
50. Id. at 67-68.
51. Id. at 68.
52. Copyright Law Professor Amicus Brief, supra note 29, at 2.
53. Id. at 1-9.
54. Plains Cotton Co-op. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc., 807 F.2d 1256
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
55. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 15, §2.15.2; Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 14 at
§13.03 [F]; J. Dianne Brinson, Copyrighted Software: Separating the Protected Expression
From Unprotected Ideas, A Starting Point, 22 Boston Col. L. Rev. 803 (1988); Dennis S.
Karjala, Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28 Jurimetrics J. 33
(1987); LasT Frontier Conference Report on Copyright Protection of Computer Software,
30 Jurimetrics J. 15 (1989); Arthur Levine, Comment on Bonito Boats Follow-up: The
Supreme Court's Likely Rejection of Nonliteral Software Copyright Protection, 6 Com-
puter Lawyer 29 (July 1989); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Pro-
tection for Application Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1045 (1989); Raymond Nimmer &
Patricia Krauthaus, Copyright and Software Technology Infringement: Defining Third
Party Development Rights, 62 Ind. L.J. 13 (1986); Reichman, Programs As Know-How,
supra note 14; Pamela Samuelson, Reflections on the State of American Copyright Law
and the Perils of Teaching It, 13 Colum. J. L. & Arts 61 (1988); Alfred Yen, A First
Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's
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decisions had employed it.56 The District Court in its Borland I deci-
sion decided to adhere to its Whelan-like test, although it added the
terms "process," "procedure," "system," and "method of operation"
to each of the three steps of the Paperback copyrightability test. Bor-
land 1, 788 F. Supp. at 90. In its three subsequent Borland decisions,
the District Court employed this modified Paperback test.
Notwithstanding the court's nominal placement of excluded ele-
ments in each of the three steps of its test, the defects of the Paper-
back test have not been cured, for the Borland opinions still seem to
equate the section 102(b) exclusions with high level abstractions. In
Borland I, for example, the District Court states that"'[p]rocess,' like
'idea,' is an abstraction. . . ." Borland I, 788 F. Supp. at 91. As we
have shown in Section II, there was much in the copyright caselaw, the
legislative histories of the Copyright Act of 1976 and of the 1980
amendments to the copyright statute concerning computer programs,
as well as the work of other copyright authorities, that the District
Court should have examined to understand both the content of sec-
tion 102(b)'s exclusions from the scope of copyright and the underly-
ing policy reasons for these exclusions.
Shortly after the District Court's Borland I decision, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals announced its adoption of the successive fil-
tering test for judging copyright infringement in computer software
cases in Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d
Cir. 1992). This test had been recommended by the authors of a dis-
tinguished copyright treatise.57 Since then, there has been a substan-
tial tide of decisions endorsing Altai and its successive filtering
method test for judging software copyright infringement. This has in-
"Total Concept and Feel," 38 Emory L.J. 393 (1989). See also Steven R. Englund, Note,
Idea, Process, or Protected Expression? Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of
Structure of Computer Programs, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 866 (1990) and Thomas Gage, Note,
Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories: Copyright Protection for Computer
Software Structure-What's the Purpose, 1987 Wisc. L. Rev. 59 (1987). But see Arthur R.
Miller, Copyright Protection For Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Gener-
ated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 977 (1993).
56. Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal.
1986); Pearl Sys., Inc. v. Competition Electronics, Inc., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1520 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
57. 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 14, at §13.03 [F]. This test had first been
recommended in David Nimmer, Richard L. Bernacchi, & Gary N. Frischling, A Struc-
tured Approach to Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copy-
right Infringement Cases, 20 Ariz. St. L. J. 625 (1988). The successive filtering test had also
been recommended to the District Court by the eleven copyright law professors who were
signatories of the previous amicus brief submitted in the Lotus v. Borland case. See Copy-
right Law Professor Amicus Brief at 7-8.
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cluded decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth,58 Tenth,59
and Federal Circuits, 6° as well as decisions by District Courts in a
number of other cases.61 Altai and its progeny have also joined the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in criticizing Whelan and the overbroad
scope of copyright protection it would have afforded to computer
programs.
62
The only trial court decision since the Second Circuit's Altai deci-
sion-other than the District Court's Borland decisions-to have
questioned Altai's successive filtering methodology and to have em-
ployed a Whelan-like approach to determining copyright infringement
in a computer software case was recently overturned on appeal in a
decision that endorses the successive filtering methodology of Altai.63
No court has ever adopted the Paperback/Borland test, except the
District Court in this case.
Notwithstanding the District Court's efforts in Borland 11, 799 F.
Supp. at 214-220, to reconcile the Paperback/Borland test with the suc-
cessive filtering methodology adopted in Altai, we do not believe the
two approaches are reconcilable for reasons we set forth in the next
subsection. This section will also show why the Altai test is more con-
sistent with traditional principles of copyright law than is the Paper-
back/Borland test.
58. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524. See also Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d
1465 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 198 (1992) (using a filtering methodology in a
software case) and Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989)
(using filtration in another kind of functional writing case).
59. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Ind. Ltd., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503 (10th
Cir. 1993)
60. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839 (Fed. Cir.
1992). See also Comprehensive Techn. Int'l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730,
734-35 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding it unnecessary to decide whether to adopt the Altai test but
citing Altai's criticism of the Whelan test).
61. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 821 F. Supp. 616 (N.D. Cal.
1993) and CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337 (M.D. Ga. 1992). A
recent English High Court of Justice opinion in John Richardson Computers v. Flanders &
Chemtec Ltd. (Chanc. Ct. 1993), has cited Altai approvingly. See Jonathan Band, Bryan A.
Schwartz, & Thomas C. Vinje, Computer Associates Crosses the Atlantic: John Richardson
Computers v. Flanders & Chemtec Ltd., 7 Int'l Computer Lawyer 2 (June 1993).
62. Altai was critical of Whelan for extending the scope of protection for programs too
far in order to give strong incentives for investing in software development, saying that this
sort of argument was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991). Altai, 982 F.2d at 711-12. As
the District Court acknowledged in its Borland II decision, Altai was critical of Paperback
for much the same reason. Borland II, 799 F. Supp. at 212.
63. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando American, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 1499 (D. Colo. 1992),
rev'd in part sub nom., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Inds. Ltd., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
1503 (10th Cir. 1993).
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B. The Successive Filtering Test For Infringement Endorsed In Altai Is
More Consistent With Traditional Principles of Copyright Law
Than Is The Paperback/Borland Test.
Although there is a superficial resemblance between the Paper-
back/Borland test and Altai's successive filtering test,64 upon closer
examination, the resemblance between the tests becomes more syn-
tactic than substantive. We will now proceed to explain this on a step-
by-step basis.
The first step of Paperback/Borland and of the Altai test call for
an abstractions analysis, but they abstract different things for different
purposes. The District Court in Borland builds a hierarchy of abstrac-
tions only for the element of the work that the defendant was alleged
to have copied, that is, for a subset of the work, not for the work as a
whole. Altai, by contrast, directs construction of a hierarchy of ab-
stractions for the whole of the copyrighted work.
The abstractions analysis in Paperback/Borland also has a differ-
ent purpose than the abstractions analysis in Altai. The truncated ab-
stractions analysis in Paperback/Borland is done to test the
"copyrightability" of that element. It aims to separate a particular el-
ement of the work and judge its "copyrightability" in isolation from its
context in the work as a whole. In Altai, the abstractions analysis is
done on the program as a whole as a preliminary step in an infringe-
ment analysis to aid the court's understanding as to where the similari-
ties between the plaintiff's and defendant's programs lie. That is,
Altai's abstractions analysis aims to gain a richer perception of the
work as a whole and to understand the place of the allegedly copied
element in context of the work as a whole.
Differences in the abstractions analyses called for by the two tests
can be seen by comparing how they would decompose the Lotus 1-2-3
program. In Borland II, the District Court built a five-level hierarchy
to test the "copyrightability" of the Lotus command hierarchy.65 At
the peak of this hierarchy was the general purpose of the work,
namely, that it was an electronic spreadsheet. The next level of the
court's abstractions hierarchy described it as a menu-driven electronic
spreadsheet. The third level was said to be a user interface involving a
system of menus, each menu consisting of fewer than a dozen com-
mands arranged hierarchically in which the main menu is the root or
64. See Borland I, 788 F. Supp. at 89-93 (setting forth both the original Paperback test
and the modified Paperback/Borland test) and Altai, 982 F.2d at 706-11.
65. As applied in Borland II, one can question whether the District Court was really
constructing an abstractions hierarchy or just dissecting certain program elements into
component parts.
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trunk of the menu tree. The fourth level was a restatement of the
third with an additional reference to the linkage of submenus by oper-
ation of a command, so that all of the spreadsheet's operations would
be accessible through the paths of the menu command hierarchy. "Fi-
nally, one may conceive of the interface as that precise set of menu
commands selected by Lotus, arranged hierarchically precisely as they
appear in 1-2-3." Borland II, 799 F. Supp. at 216. At this point, the
Paperback/Borland abstractions analysis ends.
Given that the District Court had previously characterized the
Lotus user interface and its command hierarchy as "nonliteral" ele-
ments of the Lotus program,66 one would have thought it apparent
that a hierarchy of abstractions that stopped at this "fifth" level was
incomplete. The "literal" text of the work, after all, is the complete
set of statements and instructions that constitute the computer pro-
gram as a whole. The first step of the Altai test would involve con-
structing a hierarchy of abstractions for the Lotus 1-2-3 program. This
hierarchy would show that the command hierarchy of the Lotus user
interface was actually quite high in the abstractions hierarchy for the
Lotus program as a whole.67
Although the District Court claims to have derived its abstrac-
tions analysis from Learned Hand's opinion in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), the District Court's abstractions
analysis is, in fact, not consistent with Judge Hand's formulation of the
abstractions approach. 68 Judge Hand, like his brethren in Altai, con-
templated construction of an abstractions hierarchy on the whole of
the copyrighted work,69 not on subparts of it,70 and did so with a view
66. See, e.g., Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 51-53.
67. See also Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
command hierarchy for a spreadsheet program was unpiotectable under 17 U.S.C.
§102(b)).
68. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 60.
69. "Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increas-
ing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last
may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where
they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his
'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended." Nichols, 45
F.2d at 121 (emphasis added).
70. Had the Paperback/Borland test been employed in the Nichols case, that case
might well have been decided differently than Judge Hand decided it. Under the Paper-
back/Borland first step, one would begin with a characterization of the most general state-
ment of Nichols' play as a love story; at the next level, as a love story between a man and a
woman of different ethnicities; at the next level, as a love story between a man and woman
of not only different ethnicities but of different faiths; at the next level, as a love story
between a man and a woman not only different ethnicities and different faiths, but of Jew-
ish and Irish Catholic backgrounds specifically; at the next level, as a love story between a
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to determining where in the hierarchy of the work as a whole the simi-
larities between the plaintiff's and defendant's works might lie, as
does Altai.
Nor is the Paperback/Borland second step consistent with Altai's
second step or with traditional principles of copyright law. The sole
focus of the Paperback/Borland second step is the idea/expression
merger doctrine.7' We agree with the District Court that if there is
such a narrow range of expression that to protect a particular aspect
of a program would effectively give a monopoly on an unprotectable
idea, copyright protection should not extend to that aspect of the pro-
gram under copyright's merger doctrine.72 But we do not agree with
the District Court's conclusion that merger is the only limiting princi-
ple of copyright law applicable in computer program cases, nor with
the District Court's conclusion that an aspect of a work must be
"solely dictated by function" to be unprotectable under the merger
doctrine of copyright law.7 3
The Altai second step filters out not only abstract ideas and
merged material, but also aspects of programs that are to be expected
given the kind of program involved, features that have become com-
monplace in the industry, other things that are not original to the
plaintiff or are otherwise in the public domain, and aspects of pro-
grams constrained in design by considerations of efficiency and exter-
nalities, such as the hardware with which the program is to be
compatible.74 In Altai, most of the similarities between the two pro-
grams at issue were either to be expected in programs of that kind or
pertained to that which was necessary to achieve compatibility with
other programs. Because neither kind of similarity was protectable by
Jew and Irish Catholic heterosexual couple with bigoted fathers; and so on, until one
reached the most detailed statement of what the two plays had in common in Nichols. At
this point, under the Paperback/Borland test, one would stop construction of the hierarchy
and proceed to the next step to judge whether at this level of detail, idea and expression
had merged. If they had not, one would go on to ask if the aspect copied was a substantial
or nontrivial element of the work. If so, that aspect would be "copyrightable" under the
Paperback/Borland test, and the copying of it would be infringement.
As this example reveals, notwithstanding the seeming similarity between the Altai first
step and the Paperback/Borland first step, the first steps of these two tests are, in practice,
very different.
71. Paperback, 740 F. Supp. at 61; Borland 1, 788 F. Supp. at 93.
72. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967).
73. See, e.g., Borland H, 799 F. Supp. at 214, and Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l,
Inc., 831 F. Supp. 202 (D. Mass. 1993) (Borland III). The "solely dictated by function"
issue is discussed at length supra notes 23 and 27 and accompanying texts.
74. Altai, 982 F.2d at 707-10.
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copyright law, the similarities were filtered out by the second Altai
step.
In cases that have followed Altai's lead, including Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992)"and
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Inds., Ltd., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1503
(10th Cir. 1993), application of the Altai second step has also included
the filtering out of aspects of programs that are processes, procedures,
systems, or methods of operation within the meaning of section
102(b).76 The Tenth Circuit in Gates Rubber, for example, vacated the
trial court's ruling of infringement that had been based in part on the
defendant's use of the same algorithm, instructing the trial court on
remand to consider whether this algorithm was the sort of procedure
that Congress had meant to exclude from the scope of protection by
enactment of §102(b). By carefully filtering out these kinds of unpro-
tectable elements before the infringement determination is made, the
Apple and Gates Rubber decisions conform to traditional copyright
principles and precedents.77
If Judge Hand did not see fit to mention the exclusion of systems,
processes, and the like from the scope of copyright protection in his
famous statement of the abstractions approach in Nichols, it was likely
because the kind of work with which Judge Hand was dealing-a dra-
matic play-was of an artistic and fanciful character. Because such
works are predominantly expressive in content, they generally enjoy a
broad scope of copyright protection and only their more abstract ele-
ments must generally be filtered out before an infringement analysis is
done. Since functional writings, by definition, contain not only ab-
stract ideas, but also functional elements, such as processes, proce-
dures, systems, or methods of operation, the scope of copyright
protection available to such works tends to be narrower than for artis-
tic and fanciful works. 8 The functional processes or systems these
writings describe must be filtered out before substantial similarity for
75. Id. at 714-15.
76. The Tenth Circuit's Gates Rubber decision correctly observes that the presence of
unprotectable elements may be probative on the issue of whether the defendant "copied"
something from the protected work, but must be excluded when the trier of fact gets to the
ultimate infringement determination as to whether there is substantial similarity to expres-
sive aspects of the plaintiff's work. See Alan Latman, Probative Similarity as Proof of
Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths of Copyright Infringement, 90 Colum. L. Rev.
1187 (1990).
77. See supra Section II.
78. See, e.g., Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524 (contrasting the scope of copyright for artistic and
fanciful works with the scope of protection for works with strong functional content). See
also LasT Frontier Report, supra note 55, at 18-19.
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infringement purposes can be assessed, just as the second step of the
AltailGates Rubber test directs.
The third step of the Altai test is also different in character from
the third step of the Paperback/Borland test. In this step too, the Altai
test is more consistent with traditional tests and principles of copy-
right law than is the Paperback/Borland test. After unprotectable
matter has been filtered out, Altai test directs, as the third and final
stage of analysis, a comparison between the protectable expression in
the plaintiff's work and the aspects of the defendant's work claimed to
be infringing to determine if there is substantial similarity as to pro-
tectable expression which the defendant improperly appropriated
from the plaintiff's work.79 This accords with the infringement deter-
mination made under the standard copyright infringement tests used
in the United States. °
The third step of the Paperback/Borland test, as it was initially
formulated in Borland I, focused only on whether that which had been
copied from the plaintiff's work (and which in the second step has
been determined not to be solely dictated by function) was a substan-
tial component of the plaintiff's work. Borland I, 788 F. Supp. at 90.
In Borland H, however, the District Court seemed to restate the third
step so that all that must be shown is that the creativity required to
develop the appropriated thing was more than trivial. Borland H, 799
F. Supp. at 219.
While the triviality or nontriviality of the appropriated element,
or of the creativity required to develop it, is, of course, a factor consid-
ered in all infringement actions, the Paperback/Borland third step un-
duly narrows the ultimate issue in a copyright infringement case. It
makes no room for the kind of inquiry that is traditional in copyright
infringement cases which concerns the nature and degree of similarity
between two works: that is, whether there is substantial similarity in
expressive elements which the defendant improperly appropriated
from the plaintiff's work. By addressing the ultimate issue of infringe-
ment based on the existence or absence of substantial similarity as to
expressive elements of the plaintiff's work, Altai's third step comports
with traditional copyright infringement analysis whereas the third step
of the Paperback/Borland test does not.
Thus, at every step, the successive filtering methodology adopted
by the Second, Ninth, Tenth and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals is
79. Altai, 982 F.2d at 710-11.
80. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) and 2 Goldstein, supra
note 15 §§7.1, 7.3 and 3 Nimmer on Copyright, supra note 14, §§13.01, 13.03.
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Computer programs have posed many vexing questions in the
copyright caselaw, among them, the difficult issues presented by the
present litigation. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals said in Al-
tai: "Thus far, many of the decisions [applying copyright law to nonlit-
eral elements of computer programs] reflect the courts' attempt to fit
the proverbial square peg in a round hole." Altai, 982 F.2d at 712.
The District Court has expended prodigious effort to explore the un-
charted territory presented by the facts of this and the Paperback case,
but has unfortunately faltered in its interpretation of traditional prin-
ciples of copyright law deriving from Baker v. Selden which Congress
intended to be embodied in 17 U.S.C. §102(b) and in deciding what
test to apply in this case. We urge the Court of Appeals to correct the
errors in the District Court's copyright analysis.
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